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Comments
TACKING OF POSSESSION FOR ACQUISITIVE
PRESCRIPTION
Art. 3493, Louisiana Civil Code of 1870: "The possessor is
allowed to make the sum of possession necessary to prescribe, by
adding to his own possession that of his author, in whatever
manner he may have succeeded him, whether by an universal
or particular, a lucrative or an onerous title."
Fortunately, or perhaps unfortunately, as your social philosophy
may dictate, the rigorous requirements of our law in regard to the
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prescription of immovable property are softened to a considerable
extent by this article. Its provisions grant to the possessor the right
of adding his possession to that of his author in order to complete
the requisite time for acquiring title to immovable property by pre-
scription. Likewise, Article 2235 of the French Civil Code secures-
this same right and is in all essential respects identical with our
provision of law.' Thus, it is proper to take advantage of the reser-
voir of French law and commentaries to gain enlightenment upon
the numerous problems which were ushered into our law with the
transcription of this provision into the Louisiana Civil Code.2
Perhaps the French, as well as our own redactors, could have
procured a more appropriate term than "possession" to depict just
what is "tacked," or, as the French say, "joined." It is not merely
the civil or corporal detention of an immovable which is transmitted
to the possessor, but the sum total of his author's prescriptive rights,
one of which is possession.' The good or bad faith of the possessor
in regard to prescription is the decisive consideration as to the time
and manner of acquiring.4 So too is the possessor's good or bad faith
determinative of the extent of his ability to benefit from his author's
prescriptive rights.'
A very significant word in Article 3493 is "author." It is the pos-
session of his author, which, under certain conditions, the possessor
is allowed to utilize. This term receives further illumination in Ar-
ticle 3494 and is there defined as one from whom another derives
1. Art. 2235, French Civil Code: "Pour complter ia prescription, on peut
joindre d sa posasesion cello de son author, de quelque manihre qu'on lui alt
succtd6, soiM titre universel ou particulier, 8oit d titre lucratif ou ongreux."
2. Art. 3493, La. Civil Code of 1870; Art. 3459, La. Civil Code of 1825; and
Art. 2235, French Civil Code are the same. Compiled Edition of the Civil Codes
of Louisiana, 3 Louisiana Legal Archives (1942) 1916.
3. "Bad faith is a vice which infects the possessor rather than the posses-
sion." 32 Laurent, Principes de Droit Civil (1878) 380, no 361. It follows like-
wise that good faith is a quality of the possessor's personality and not of the
possession. Thus the term possession does not embody the character of the per-
sonality of the possessor. On the other hand prescription does, and Article 3479
of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 recognizes this distinction when it enumerates
the requisites necessary for the decennial prescription. "To acquire the ownership
of immovables . . . four conditions must concur: 1. Good faith on the part of
the possessor. . . . 3. Possession . .. ."
4. Arts. 3478, 3479, La. Civil Code of 1870.
5. 2 Aubry et Rau, Cours de Droit Civil Franqais (5 ed. 1897) 553, 554, no
218; 4 Beudant, Cours de Droit Civil Franqais (2 ed. 1934) 853, no 770; 32
Laurent, op. cit. supra note 3, at 380, no 361 et seq.; 1 Planiol, Trait6 El~men-
taire de Droit Civil (10 ed. 1925) 872, nos 2674, 2676, 2677.
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his rights, whether by universal, particular, or any other titlc.' It is
manifest that the existence of some juridical link is an essential in-
gredient to the successor's ability to acquire his predecessor's pre-
scriptive rights.'
The Louisiana Supreme Court has often recognized the neces-
sity of a juridical link as a condition precedent to tacking.' To illus-
trate this postulate, if A possesses corporally a fifty acre tract of land
and sells to B thirty acres thereof and B enters and takes corporal
possession of the entire fifty acres, B can tack to his own possession
only that which A transmitted to him-possession of the thirty acres.
As to the additional twenty acres, A is not B's author because no
juridical link exists between them.'
Article 3493 contains no separate provision for the universal
successor as distinguished from the successor by a particular title.
Nevertheless, different considerations present themselves accord-
ingly.'0
THE SUccESSOR BY UNIVERSAL TinE
The most important and distinguishing feature of the universal
successor is that he does not commence a new possession but merely
continues the possession commenced by his predecessor." Beudant
points out very significantly, "It is not a junction of possessions
which takes place, but is rather a continuation of his author's pos-
6. Art. 3494, La. Civil Code of 1870: "By the word author in the preceding
article, is understood the person from whom another derives his right, whether
by a universal title, as by succession, or by particular title, as by sale, by dona-
tion, or any other title, onerous or gratuitous.
"Thus, in every species of prescription, the possession of the heir may be
joined to that of the ancestor, and the possession of the buyer to that of the
seller."
7. Planiol, op. cit. supra note 5, at 873, no 2678.
8. Sibley v. Pierson, 125 La. 478, 51 So. 502 (1909); Harang v. Golden Ranch
Land and Drainage Co., 143 La. 982, 79 So. 768 (1918); McHugh v. Albert Han-
son Lumber Co., 145 La. 421, 82 So. 392 (1919); Emmer v. Rector, 175 La. 82,
143 So. 11 (1932) (affirming both the Sibley and Harang cases, supra). Contra:
Durel v. Tennison, 31 La. Ann. 538 (1879).
Tacking as relates to acquisitive prescription should be distinguished from
that which is allowed in regard to boundaries. Opdenwyer v. Brown, 155 La. 617,
99 So. 482 (1924); Henly v. Kask, 11 So. (2d) 230 (La. App. 1942).
9. Sibley v. Pierson, 125.La. 478, 51 So. 502 (1909).
10. 1 Baudry-Lacantinerie Pr~cis de Droit Civil (14 ed. 1926) 715, no 1460;
Laurent, op. cit. supra note 5, at 376-379, nos 357-360; 12 Maread6, Explication
du Droit Civil (7 ed. 1874) 134, no 111; 9 Pothier, Oeuvres de Pothier (2 ed.
1861) 361, no 122; 1 Troplong, Droit Civil (4 ed. 1857) 606-608, nos 429-431.
11. Griffon v. Blanc, 12 La. Ann. 5 (1857) (a very comprehensive treatment
of the subject); Spencer Adm. v. Lewis, Adm., 39 La. Ann. 316, 1 So. 671 (1887)
(reaffirmed the Griffon v. Blanc case, supra). See note 10, supra, for the French
commentaries.
.1071947]. COMMENTS
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
session and person."' 2 Laurent further describes the transaction as
one by which the possession and person of the author is confused
with that of the successor.'3
As far as the universal successor is concerned, it would be more
accurate to leave out tacking and its connotations and describe this
transaction as a mandatory substitution. Moreover, the universal suc-
cessor has no choice with reference to his author's prescriptive rights.
He is powerless to refuse them or change their character.
The successor acquires something more than his author's prior
naked possession. A few hypothetical illustrations may be helpful in
order to study the effect of good or bad faith upon the successor's
substitution for his author. Two situations may be contemplated:
First, the author was in good faith and the successor is a bad faith
possessor. Conversely, the author was a bad faith possessor and the
successor is in good faith. It is necessary to assume that the possession
meets all the requisites for prescription.
In the first hypothet the author could have, if he had lived, pre-
scribed for the immovable in ten years.' 4 Although the successor is
in bad faith, this does not vitiate his right to acquire by the ten years
acquisitive prescription, because he does not commence a new pos-
session, but is merely substituted for his author and continues in his
personality and possession." The law regards this as one possession.
Therefore, under Article 3482 of the Louisiana Civil Code and Ar-
ticle 2269 of the French Code, if the possessor commences in good
faith and subsequently becomes a bad faith possessor, his right to
acquire by the ten years acquisitive prescription will not be affected.' 6
In the second supposition, the author was in bad faith and the
successor is of good faith. Again the persons are confused as well as
the possessions, and the successor may acquire only by the thirty
12. Beudant, op. cit. supra note 5, at 853, no 770.
13. Laurent, op. cit. supra note 5, at 380, no 861.
14. Art. 3478, La. Civil Code of 1870.
15. Aubrey et Rau, op. cit. supra note 5, at 553, no 218; Baudry-Lacantinerie,
op. cit. supra note 10, at 715, no 1461; Beudant, op. cit. supra note 5, at 858, no
770; Laurent, op. cit. supra note 5, at 376-379, no 357-360; Marcad6, op. cit. supra
note 10, at 135, no 113; Planiol, op. cit. supra note 5, at 872, no 2674; Pothier,
op. cit. supra note 10, at 358, nos 112, 122, 861; Troplong, op. cit. supra note 10,
at 606, no 429. See Griffon v. Blanc, 12 La. Ann. 5 (1857); Spencer Adm. v.
Lewis, Adm., 89 La. Ann. 316, 1 So. 671 (1887). The supreme court relied
heavily upon Marcad6, supra, in deciding the Griffon v. Blanc case, supra.
16. Art. 3482, La. Civil Code of 1870: "It is sufficient if the possession has
commenced in good faith; and if the possession should afterwards be held in bad
faith, that shall not prevent the prescription." Art. 2269, French Civil Code. 'Il
8uffit quo la bonne foi ait exists au nmoment do 'acquisition."
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years prescription in spite of his personal good faith, which the law
now ignores.1 Being one possession which has commenced in bad
faith, the subsequent good faith is immaterial.
Simply stated, the universal successor is but a protraction of his
author and is powerless to change or reject these prescriptive rights,
which were predetermined for him at the moment of his author's
acquisition."
THE SUCCESSOR BY PARTICULAR TITLE
Accurately speaking, tacking is applicable only to the successor
by particular title. 9 It is he who commences a new and distinct pos-
session entirely separate from that of his author.2 ° To him the law
has accorded a privilege under certain circumstances to accept or
reject his author's prescriptive rights.2 Since this is a new possession,
there are now two personalities and two possessions to consider, as
well as the good or bad faith of each.
If both are possessors in good faith, the law allows the successor
to add his possession to that of his author to acquire the immovable
in ten years.2 2 Likewise, if both are possessors in bad faith, the suc-
cessor may plead thirty years acquisitive prescription and add his
17. Griffon v. Blanc, 12 La. Ann. 5 (1857); Spencer, Adm. v. Lewis, Adm.,
39 La. Ann. 816, 1 So. 671 (1887). In the latter case the court said, "It is fully
settled that a universal legatee succeeds to the testator's rights with their defects,
8uccedit in vitia et virtutes, and is charged with his author's defects, infirmities
and bad faith." See note 15, supra, for the French commentators.
18. Pothier, op. cit. supra note 10, at 361, no 122. "The Heir succeeds to the
obligations of the defunct and the obligation rests on prescription. . . . On the
contrary a successor by particular title does not succeed to the person or the
obligations."
No 123. ".. . the successor by particular title is subrograted to all his
author's rights in regard to the thing received."
19. Beudant, op. cit. supra note 5, at 853, no 770.
20. Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 5, at 554, no 218; Laurent, op. cit.
supra note 5, at 380, no 361; Marcad6, op. cit. supra note 10, at 134, no 111.
21. Pothier, op. cit. supra note 10, at 361, no 122; Troplong, op. cit. supra
note 10, at 607, no 431.
22. Innis v. Miller, 10 Mart. (0. S.) 289, 13 Am. Dec. 830 (La. 1821); Kohl-
man v, Glaudi, 52 La. Ann. 700, 27 So. 116 (1899) (good faith must exist in the
author); Gauthier v. Cason, 107 La. 52, 31 So. 386 (1902); Brewster v. Hewes,
113 La. 45, 36 So. 883 (1904); Vance v. Ellerbe, 150 La. 388, 90 So. 735 (1922);
Barnett v. Botany Bay Lumber Co., 172 La. 205, 133 So. 446 (1931) (reaffirmed
the Innis v. Miller case, supra); Laroux v. Myers, 144 So. 117 (La. App. 1932);
Buillard v. Davis, 185 La. 255, 169 So. 78 (1936) (author and successor must
both have a title translative of property); Beudant, op. cit. supra note 5, at 853,
no 770; Baudry-Lancantinerie, op. cit. supra note 10, at 716-717, no 1462; Lau-
rent, op. cit. supra note 5, at 380, no 361; Marcad6, op. cit. supra note 10, at 135,
no 114; Planiol, op. cit. supra note 5, at 872, no 2676; Troplong, op. cit. supra
note 10, at 607, no 431.
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predecessor's possession to his own to complete the period.23 Appar-
ently there is no objection to tacking in these instances because both
the author and the successor have the requisites for the prescription
which the latter pleads.24
If the author is a possessor in bad faith and the successor is in
good faith, the successor would not be prevented from acquiring
title to the immovable by possession in his own right for ten years."
Unlike the universal successor, he commences a new possession and
is not substituted for his author.2" The law does accord him the bene-
fit of utilizing his author's possession, but only for the thirty year
prescription." The rationale of the commentators is that the suc-
cessor is subrogated to the bad faith prescriptive rights of his author,
and his own rights as a possessor in good faith would, of course, in-
clude the lesser advantages for the thirty years prescription.2" Again,
it must be assumed that each of the two possessors met all the other
requirements for the prescription which is being pleaded.29
Conversely, if the author was a possessor in good faith and the
successor is in bad faith, the French view is that the successor should
be permitted to plead only the thirty years prescription because his
possession in bad faith cannot be remedied by his author's possession
in good faith." Although the successor cannot avail himself of his
author's good faith, he may nevertheless tack to the extent necessary
for the thirty year period.3" His author's good faith prescriptive
rights being more favorable in the eyes of the law would include
the lesser qualities for the bad faith prescription. 2
23. Cognevich v. Blazio, 159 La. 1035, 106 So. 556 (1925); Johnson v. Con-
gregation Daughters of the Cross, 162 La. 657, 110 So. 894 (1926); Emmer v.
Rector, 175 La. 82, 143 So. 11 (1932). See Moulierre v. Coco, 116 La. 845, 41
So. 113, 115 (1906). See note 22, supra, for the supporting commentators.
24. Beudant, op. cit. supra note 5, at 853, no 770; Baudry-Lacantinerie, op.
cit. supra note 10, at 716-717, no 1462.
25. Art. 3478, La. Civil Code of 1870.
26. See note 20, supra.
27. Presumably the supreme court would follow this concept though no case
in point nor any dictum expressly to that effect could be found by your author.
Cf. Laurent, op. cit. supra note 5, at 375, no 856; Marcad, op. cit. supra note 10,
at 135, no 114; Planiol, op. cit. supra note 5, at 872, no 2677.
28. Ibid.
29. See note 24, supra.
30. Aubrey et Rau, op. cit. supra note 5, at 554, no 218; Baudry-Lacantinerie,
op. cit. supra note 10, at 716-717, no 1462; Laurent, op. cit. supra note 5, at 880,
no 361; Marcad6, op. cit. supra note 10, at 135, no 114; Planiol, op. cit. supra
note 5, at 872, no 2677. Contra: the entire Louisiana jurisprudence as will be
seen; also Troplong, op. cit. supra note 10, at 612, no 432. Our jurisprudence is
in accord with Troplong and allows the bad faith possessor the benefit of their
authors' good faith to acquire by the decennial prescription.
31. Ibid.
32. Planiol, op. cit. supra note 5, at 872, no 2677.
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As to this last proposition, the opposite doctrine has developed
and has become well settled in Louisiana jurisprudence, even though
contrary to the great preponderance of the French doctrinal authori-
ties."3 In the very early case of Devall v. Choppin34 the Louisiana
Supreme Court, relying exclusively upon the writings of Troplong,
enunciated the proposition that if a successor showed that one of his
authors was a possessor in good faith and had all the necessary in-
gredients for ten year prescription, he could acquire by the ten year
good faith prescription even though he as well as an intermediate
author possessed in bad faith. The court cited Article 3482 of the
Louisiana Civil Code in support of this conclusion. This provision
is in all essential respects identical with Article 2269 of the French
Civil Code upon which Troplong predicated his philosophy, 5 and
which has been criticized at great length by Marcad6 and Laurent."
A logical analysis of Troplong's position would seem to indi-
cate that a fallacious conclusion was reached both by him and the
Louisiana Supreme Court. Article 3482 allows the possessor who
commences his possession in good faith and subsequently becomes a
bad faith possessor to retain his rights to the decennial acquisitive
prescription. 7 As we have previously seen, the successor by partic-
ular title commences a new possession which is separate and distinct
from that of his predecessor, while the universal successor issin effect
substituted for his author and retains unaltered his author's pre-
scriptive rights irrespective of his own good or bad faith.38 It would
logically follow that there are as many commencements of posses-
sions as there are successors by particular title." Troplong seeks to
consolidate the units of possession and treat them as a whole by a
strained interpretation of the code articles and to allow the bad faith
possessor the right to acquire in ten years by virtue of his author's
good faith.4" This conclusion does not follow the logical analysis of
the principle since each successor commences a possession for him-
self on the basis of which he may prescribe without benefit of tack-
38. DevalI v. Choppin, 15 La. 566 (1840); Liquidators of Prudential Savings
and Homestead Soc. v. Langermann, 156 La. 76, 100 So. 55 (1924). See Brewster
v. Hewes, 118 La. 45, 51, 36 So. 888, 885 (1904); Vance v. Ellerbe, 150 La. 888,
400, 90 So. 785, 789 (1922); Wheat v. Baer and Thayer Hardwood Co., Inc., 181
So. 807, 810 (La. App. 1980).
34. 15 La. 566 (1840).
85. See note 16, supra.
86. Laurent, op. cit. supra note 5, at 380, no 861; Maread6, op. cit. supra
note 10, at 189, no 115.
37. See note 16, supra.
38. See note 10, supra.
39. See note 86, supra.
40. Troplong, op. cit. supra note 10, at 612, no 482.
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ing, and the character of his author's possession cannot remedy his
bad faith. 1 The law has left to him the prescription of thirty years,
and for this purpose he may utilize his author's prescriptive rights. 2
If the present possessor and each of his authors commenced their
respective possessions in good faith and each during their possessions
became a bad faith possessor, then Article 3482, if properly and gen-
erously applied, would allow the successor to total these possessions
and prescribe in ten years.4
Despite this logical analysis, justification for the Devall doctrine
can be found in social philosophy rather than in the confines of
logic. The clash of social views is very noticeable in the French com-
mentators. Troplong favors a liberal interpretation of the precepts of
prescription, especially with regard to the principle of tacking,
whereas his adversaries are conservative, favoring a narrow, logical
and restrictive application of the legal principles. The Louisiana
Supreme Court has adopted the liberal attitude on the subject of
acquisitive prescription. With this in mind, the criticism of the
Devall doctrine should not be so severe; for the human element has
expanded and contracted the limits of the law to accommodate
social views.
CONCLUSION
A brief summary of the status of the Louisiana law upon this
subject is as follows: First, as a condition precedent to tacking, there
must be an author-successor relationship created by some juridical
act. Second, if this relationship is established by universal title, the
successor will be substituted for his author and the prescriptive
rights of the latter will determine the successor's rights irrespective
of the nature of his possession. Third, if the possessor succeeds by a
particular title, or any other juridical act, he commences a new and
distinct possession; and if the successor pleads the ten years prescrip-
tion, he may tack only if he can establish as a starting point the
essentials of that prescription in one of his authors. Otherwise, if
tacking is necessary to prescribe, he can avail himself of his author's
rights only for the purpose of thirty years bad faith prescription. The
Devall doctrine, though questionable in logic, is well settled from a
practical viewpoint, and a reversal in that respect is a rather remote
possibility.
HERSCHEL N. KNIGHT
41. See note 86, supra.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
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